This paper evaluates the effect of the Federal Reserve's large scale asset purchases (LSAP) on international long bond yields and exchange rates, then considers whether the observed behavior is consistent with a simple portfolio balance model and standard exchange rate parity conditions. The LSAP announcements substantially reduced international long-term bond yields and the spot value of the dollar. These changes closely followed announcement times and were very unlikely to have occurred by chance. A simple portfolio choice model explains the changes in foreign bond yields but underestimates the U.S. yield changes. Likewise, the LSAP announcements prompt smaller exchange rate responses than parity conditions imply, but the actual responses are qualitatively consistent with those predictions. The LSAP's success in reducing international long-term interest rates and the value of the dollar shows that central banks are not toothless when short rates hit the zero bound.
by type and looking at pooled and unpooled effects across countries. This assumes homogeneous effects of interventions within policy classes that include interest rate cuts, liquidity support, liability guarantees, and recapitalization, from many countries on many financial variables. This bold approach presents a broad view of average effects but does not substitute for a close examination of the specific effects of heterogeneous announcements.
Two papers study the LSAP program specifically. Stroebel and Taylor (2009) argue the Federal Reserve's purchases of MBS produce small or statistically insignificant effects on mortgage-Treasury spreads that are adjusted for pre-payment and default risks. Stroebel and Taylor (2009) differs from the current study in looking for effects of transactions on spreads, rather than announcement effects on yields. Although they note that "the MBS purchase program reduced the Treasury-OAS [option adjusted spread] by about 30 bps" (p. 20), they credit this decline to an increased commitment to guarantee GSE liabilities. In contrast to Stroebel and Taylor's (2009) methods and conclusions, Gagnon et al. (2010) cite announcement effects and a statistical model of debt yields to argue that the LSAP did reduce U.S. long-term yields (see also Kohn (2009) and Meyer and Bomfim (2010) ). 1 Because Fama's (1970) efficient markets hypothesis states that markets react rapidly to publicly available information, asset prices should react immediately to LSAP news, not to expected transactions. 2 Therefore Gagnon et al.'s (2010) event study methods seem most appropriate to the study of LSAP effects. Hamilton and Wu (2010) model the term structure of U.S. debt to study the effects of changes in its maturity structure. Their point estimates of the effects of a large swap of shortterm for long-term debt are roughly consistent with the predictions of the simple portfolio balance model in this paper.
All of the above studies consider domestic effects of financial crisis programs. In addition to influencing U.S. yields, however, the LSAP will affect international asset prices because risk-arbitrage ties expected international returns closely together in a world of capital mobility. 3 The contribution of this paper is to evaluate the LSAP's effect on international long bond yields and exchange rates, as well as to consider whether the observed asset price behavior is consistent with a simple portfolio balance model and standard exchange rate parity conditions. The LSAP program significantly reduced the 10-year yields of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom and also depreciated the USD versus the currencies of those countries. This paper asks how much of the observed changes in yields and immediate exchange rate movements can be explained by a simple portfolio balance and UIP-PPP model, respectively. The LSAP effects on expected real U.S. bond yields somewhat exceed those implied by portfolio choice model, but the changes in international bond yields are consistent with such a model. Exchange rates changes at the time of the LSAP announcements are smaller than-but in the same direction as-those implied by an "overshooting" effect produced by UIP and long-run purchasing power parity (PPP). Overall, the evidence is consistent with a strong but plausible portfolio balance effect, coupled with a flight to quality that mitigated the predicted exchange rate effects. These findings reinforce and significantly extend the view of Gagnon et al. (2010) that central banks retain effective tools at the zero bound.
The LSAP Events
The LSAP program consisted of suggestions of possible future purchases, firm statements of planned purchases, including time-frames and quantities, and announcements of purchase slowdowns and a cutback. FOMC statements and speeches described the motives for these asset purchases in several ways but repeatedly returned to the themes of directly supporting credit markets-especially for housing-to increase the availability and affordability of credit with the ultimate goal of stimulating the economy. That is, the intermediate goal was to reduce mediumand long-term U.S. interest rates.
To determine the impact of these purchases, we must look at announcement effects because efficient markets should react to news about future asset values, not to expected transactions. Examination of press releases, FOMC member speeches, FOMC statements, and news reports confirms Gagnon et al.' s assessment that 8 events/announcements associated with the LSAP program had potentially important information: 5 of those events discussed purchases or suggested future purchases; 3 discussed slowing and/or limiting purchases. Table 1 securities on the open market in substantial quantities." The December 16, 2008, FOMC press release said that the Federal Reserve was evaluating the possibility of buying long-term Treasury debt. The January 28 th FOMC statement reiterated that the Fed stood ready to buy additional agency and Treasury debt if such actions would help credit market conditions. 5 This failure to actually announce purchases disappointed markets, but the FOMC soon announced such specific plans on March 18, 2009: "The Committee decided today to increase the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to improve credit market conditions, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months."
These purchases were of unprecedented size. Gagnon et al. (2010) estimate that the $1.725 trillion dollar total debt purchase is 22 percent of the long-term agency debt, fixed-rate agency MBS, and Treasury securities outstanding as of November 24, 2008, just prior to the first LSAP announcement. This calculation properly takes a fairly comprehensive view of substitutes for U.S. Treasury debt, but it also excludes U.S. corporate debt, which is appropriate in view of the extreme behavior of corporate-Treasury spreads during this period.
To briefly summarize Gagnon et al. (2010) on the program's institutional details: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York purchased securities across the yield curve, with maturities from 3 months to 30 years, but bought most heavily in 4-to 10-year and "underpriced" issues.
The rate of purchase was fairly steady, but increased (decreased) when liquidity was good (poor).
Three announcements caused the public to expect slower or reduced purchases: On August 18, 2009, the FOMC statement announced that the Treasury purchases would be finished by the end of October, rather than September 18, as originally announced. On September 23, 2009, the FOMC statement said that agency debt and MBS purchases would be slowed and finished by the end of 2010Q1, rather than the end of 2009. On November 4, 2009, the FOMC reduced the planned purchase of agency debt from $200 billion to $175 billion. Gagnon at al. (2010) strongly argue that the LSAP reduced U.S. yields through a portfolio balance effect: By removing duration and convexity from private portfolios, the LSAP reduced the return required for holding a diminished amount of this risk. 6 One would like to quantify how much of a portfolio balance effect to expect from a given purchase announcement, however. To determine this, we consider how reducing available supply affects the portfolio choice of a mean-variance investor who represents all agents except the Federal Reserve and the U.S. government. The investor chooses an N-by-1 vector of portfolio weights (w) to maximize the following function of asset returns:
What To Expect?

A portfolio balance model of real bond returns
where μ is the N-by-1 vector of expected net returns on the assets, V is the N-by-N covariance matrix of the asset returns and γ is the investor's coefficient of relative risk aversion. The following expression gives the optimal portfolio weights:
6 Long-term yields are the sum of average expected future short rates and the risk premium. The term premium, which compensates investors for the risk of rising interest rates, is the major component of the U.S. Treasury risk premium; credit and liquidity premia also contribute to MBS and agency debt risk premia. Convexity denotes the tendency of bonds with prepayment risk, such as MBS, to fall in duration as interest rates rise.
. 7 (2)
If the Federal Reserve purchases a large portion of some asset with inelastic supply (at least in the short-run), such as MBS, agency debt, or long-term Treasuries, then market clearing requires the public's portfolio holdings of that asset to decline commensurately. Some linear combination of expected returns on the N assets must change to induce the investor to willingly reduce his holdings of the asset, or the quantity demanded would exceed the quantity supplied. 8
After an asset purchase that changes the public's portfolio weights from to , the change in the expected asset returns, Δμ, would be given by the following:
Δµ.
Equation (3) (2010)). Therefore Treasuries and agency obligations are extremely close substitutesessentially the same asset-for international portfolio choice decisions.
While it is most natural to think of a large purchase of those domestic securities affecting U.S. Treasury and agency bond prices/yields, equation (3) shows that the prices/returns on all correlated assets-especially those on closely correlated assets such as high-quality, long-term foreign bonds-will generally need to adjust to clear markets. Specifically, if the decrease in available quantity of Treasuries raises their price, then investors will tend to purchase the now relatively cheaper debt of similar quality-i.e., sovereign debt of other developed countriesdriving up the price of that debt. Equation (3) shows that the change in the expected returns to country k's bonds is the product of the reduction in the weight of U.S. bonds in the market and the covariance between the real U.S. bond returns of country k and those of the United States. 9
That is, the LSAP programs should not only raise prices/reduce expected returns on MBS, agency debt, and Treasuries, but should also reduce expected real U.S. returns on foreign bonds with positively correlated returns.
Is foreign long-term sovereign debt a close substitute for U.S. debt of similar maturity?
Comovement of yields and returns suggests that it is. Figure 1 bond yields more than foreign bond yields.
Of course, the LSAP program increased bank reserves commensurately with the decrease 9 Note that the change-in-weights vector, (w 1 -w 0 ) in (3), consists of zeros, except for the element reflecting U.S. weights, which is equal to -0.22 times the original weight on U.S. bonds. Although the change-in-return calculation in (3) would appear to depend on γ, it does not. The original portfolio weights are calculated from equation (2): w V µ and the new portfolio weight vector, w 1 , equals w 0 , except for a 22 percent reduction on the U.S. bond share in w 0 . Therefore the risk-aversion parameter does not affect the change-in-return calculation in equation (3) because its value in the numerator of (3) is cancelled by its effect on the denominators of the formulas for w 0 and w 1 . 10 Warnock and Warnock (2009) find international capital flows substantially affect long-term U.S. interest rates.
in public bond holdings. The increase in bank reserves reflects a strong desire for safe, liquid assets that the simple portfolio balance model is ill-equipped to model with its focus on the means and covariances of asset returns. Therefore the benchmark portfolio balance model does not directly model the market for bank reserves.
The simple portfolio balance model in equation (3) 
Bond yields and the time path of exchange rates
The portfolio choice model implies that a purchase of U.S. debt would tend to reduce expected U.S. returns at least as much as expected returns on foreign debt. This difference in expected returns will very likely translate into differences in relative yields that should affect expected exchange rate changes. If U.S. yields decline more than foreign yields, for example, UIP would predict that the USD must be expected to appreciate over the relevant horizon, compared to its previous sample path. This subsection describes what sort of exchange rate changes that UIP-PPP parity conditions imply, conditional on the LSAP bond yield changes.
But why consider UIP effects, given UIP's empirical failure when applied to floating exchange rates? 12 UIP remains a benchmark for foreign exchange behavior for several reasons.
First, UIP's failure has three important exceptions. Flood and Rose (1996) have shown that UIP performs much better for target zone exchange rates where expectations are tied down; Chaboud and Wright (2005) have shown that UIP holds over very short horizons; and-most relevant for the present study- Chinn and Meredith (2004) and Chinn (2006) have shown that UIP holds over very long horizons. Second, UIP remains intuitively attractive and a workhorse of economic modeling, despite the complications that poorly understood risk premia and/or volatile expectations probably produce.
UIP implies that the expected change in the exchange rate over a horizon of N years should be a function of interest differentials at that horizon. This should be true both before and after the announcement. 13 That is,
where the expectations operators E (E ) denote expectations taken prior to (after) the announcement at time t, s N is the log of the foreign-currency-per-dollar in period t+N, s s is the log exchange rate just before (after) the announcement and,i ,N and i ,N US (i ,N and i ,N US ) are the logs of the gross yields of foreign and U.S. zero-coupon debt over N years before (after) the announcement.
The announcement effect on the expected exchange rate in N years is (5) less (4).
Are the UIP-implied "jumps" in the exchange rate at the time of the announcement, (s s ) in (6), consistent with the actual, measured jumps in exchange rates? Two reasonable assumptions about long-run exchange rate expectations enable one to calculate the UIP-implied jump.
 Assumption 1: PPP holds in the long run; the real exchange rate is stationary. Therefore the long-run expectation of the real exchange rate, q , is always approximately the unconditional mean of the real exchange rate, q .
Assumption 1 implies that the expected long-run nominal rate after the announcement is the expected long-run nominal rate prior to the announcement plus the announcement effect on expected long-run relative price levels (i.e., ∆E , p N p N US ):
where ∆ , denotes the change in a variable at the time of the announcement at time t.
 Assumption 2: The long run is 10 years, which is the longest maturity of consistent BIS zero-coupon data.
Equating the right-hand sides of (6) and (8) and rearranging provides an expression for the announcement jump size in terms of changes in observable interest and price level differentials.
That is, the jump size equals the change in the relative expected long run real interest rate.
Intuitively, UIP requires expected dollar appreciation over the long run, compared with its previous expected path, because the LSAP "buy" events reduced U.S. real yields relative to foreign real yields. But if the long-run real exchange rate is unchanged, then the dollar must jump depreciate at the time of the announcement, as in the Dornbush (1976) "overshooting" model. 14 One can compare the implied exchange rate jump in (9) with the observed change in the exchange rate during the announcement windows to test the UIP-PPP model.
What do changes in real U.S. returns imply for yields on foreign bonds?
Are 
where , is the nominal return to the foreign bond in a foreign currency, ∆ is the change in foreign currency units per USD, and is the U.S. inflation rate. Applying the expectations and difference operators to (10), the expected change in the foreign nominal return is as follows: In summary, the portfolio balance and UIP-PPP models make three testable predictions about asset prices during LSAP windows: 1) U.S. long-bond expected real returns-or their equivalent in real yields-fall 29 to 150 basis points; 2) the USD jump depreciates according to equation (9); 3) foreign 10-year, expected real returns in U.S. goods fall 20 to 134 basis points.
Methods
Because asset prices react relatively rapidly to "news" that shapes market participants' views of fundamentals, an event study of the LSAP announcement effects is most appropriate.
Event studies assume that causality runs one way from the announcements to the asset returns. 15
That is, policymakers determine the announcement prior to observing asset price movements within the announcement window; so, the latter changes have no effect on the announcement.
Event studies have often used very high frequency data to precisely measure the rapid asset price changes usually seen after macro announcements. LSAP announcements might produce protracted adjustment periods, however. In fact, the announcement literature has shown that unexpected news or heterogeneous interpretations of news will extend adjustment periods (e.g., Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) , Love and Payne (2008) and Gagnon et al. (2010) ).
For example, Evans (2010) interprets evidence in Carlson and Lo (2006) to indicate that the market took hours to fully adjust to a surprise Bundesbank interest rate hike. Therefore, this study will initially consider a relatively long, 2-day window around the announcements before turning to intraday data for high frequency analysis. 16 Typical studies of macro announcement effects pool estimates of reactions across many events, assuming a constant relation between the unexpected portion of the announcement and the asset price movement. 17 Unfortunately, it is difficult to separately quantify the effect on expectations of each of the 8 LSAP announcements because one cannot easily measure LSAP expectations. Some announcements might have been partially expected, and so the surprise component was small; other events might have induced large expectations of purchases although no actual purchases were announced. One might think, however, that the combined set of LSAP announcements correctly informed market expectations about the eventual size of the program.
Therefore this paper considers separate effects for each of the 8 LSAP announcements, as well as the sum of the "buy" and "sell" effects.
To illustrate the size of the LSAP announcement effects compared with ordinary news, I compare the LSAP reactions to the historical distributions of 2-day asset price changes. In addition, I follow Gagnon et al. (2010) in comparing the LSAP effects with those of FOMC announcements that contain no information about the LSAP. These results-omitted for brevity -confirm that the LSAP announcements affected yields much more than other FOMC news.
If all changes in LSAP expectations occur within the event windows and the LSAP drives all changes in expectations during event windows, then the sum of the event window yield changes exactly measures the impact of the LSAP. The changes in LSAP expectations outside the event windows or a non-zero net effect of non-LSAP news within the event window-e.g., 16 The overall results with 1-day and 2-day windows produced qualitatively comparable inference. The 2-day changes in yields/prices tended to be of the same sign and larger than the 1-day changes, however, suggesting a protracted market adjustment to these unusual LSAP announcements. The U.S. Baa and 30-year mortgage yields and expected U.S. inflation exhibited the largest discrepancies between the 1-and 2-day windows. The U.S. Baa and 30-year mortgage yields cumulatively fell 26 and 27 more basis points, respectively, during the 2-day windows than during the 1-day windows. 10-year expected U.S. inflation was particularly volatile, being cumulatively about 45 basis points higher over the 2-day windows than over the 1-day windows. 17 Neely and Dey (2010) 
The Data
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provided daily data on U.S. and foreign 10-
year zero-coupon interest rates and short-term rates. Haver Analytics provided further daily bond yields, U.S. TIPS-implied inflation expectations, daily exchange rates, and equity prices. The increase in Treasury and Baa yields on January 28, 2009, deserves some explanation.
The Effect of LSAP on International Asset Prices
Daily results
Prior to this date, Federal Reserve officials had twice mentioned the possibility of purchasing Treasuries and the market probably priced-in a sizeable positive probability of an actual Treasury purchase announcement on January 28. The lack of such news probably significantly increased long yields by reducing market expectations for Treasury purchases.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows that the three sell events-in which previously announced purchases were marginally delayed or scaled back-did not strongly or consistently affects U.S. bond yields, presumably because they changed expectations very little in comparison with several of the LSAP buy announcements. That is, the first two sell announcements merely delayed the pace of purchases somewhat and the third sell announcement merely scaled back one component of the purchase by $25 billion, only 1.45 percent of the total announced LSAP purchase of $1.725 trillion.
The right-hand side of Table 2 shows that the LSAP buy announcements were also-if more remarkably-associated with large changes in foreign bond yields: Australian, Canadian, German, Japanese, and British long bond yields cumulatively fell by 78, 54, 50, 19, and 65 basis points during the same 5 buy event windows. 19 Japanese long yields were already much lower than those of other countries (see Figure 1 ), which probably accounts for their relatively small reaction. P-values in parentheses show that the individual yield changes during buy event windows were often very large compared with typical 2-day changes during the 2005-2010 sample. Similarly, the p-values for the "event sum" rows show that there is essentially no chance that one would randomly obtain foreign yield drops as large as those observed during the LSAP buy announcement days. As with U.S. bonds, foreign bond yields either rose or did not fall much in the January 28 window and they also did not react strongly to the 3 sell events. 19 A study with BIS 10-year zero coupon yields instead of the Haver bond yields produced very similar results. Did the LSAP announcements of long-term debt purchases also influence short-term yields? Table 3 documents little strong or consistent movement of international short-term rates during the LSAP buy and sell windows. U.S. short-term rates fell modestly on some announcements, mostly before the federal funds target hit zero on December 16, 2008, but the LSAP announcements had very little effect on foreign short-term interest rates. This lack of response from short-term interest rates is consistent with the argument of Gagnon et al. (2010) that the LSAP did not affect expected short rates significantly but rather lowered bond risk premia by reducing the required return for holding duration and convexity. Table 4 shows the LSAP announcement effects on the foreign exchange value of the USD during the same event windows. The USD cumulatively declined by 3.6 to almost 10.8 percent-depending on the currency-over the 5 buy days, and these declines were very large compared with the typical movements in the value of the dollar. 20 The chance that the USD would depreciate so strongly if the LSAP buy events contained no unusual information is no greater than 10 percent for all the exchange rates. In contrast, the LSAP sell events had no large or consistent effect on the value of the dollar. Although I omit the full results for brevity, there was only a modest tendency for the dollar to depreciate on the 13 "non-LSAP" FOMC announcement windows. The movements on the "non-LSAP" days were not nearly as large, on average, as on LSAP buy days and were not consistent across exchange rates. The USD appreciated, for example, against the JPY during the 13 "non-LSAP" control days.
Intraday analysis
The daily event studies strongly suggest that the LSAP announcements significantly reduced U.S. and foreign bond yields, as well as the foreign exchange value of the dollar. The largest appreciation of the dollar during these events came on December 1, 2008, when unexpectedly poor construction spending and ISM survey news pushed down U.S. and global equity markets, creating a flight to safety. That day's appreciation was especially large against the GBP, perhaps because the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the U.K. government would back all retail deposits of London Scottish. Analysts widely interpreted this announcement to mean that the British government would back all retail bank deposits. reaction in the foreign exchange market (center panel) was somewhat faster, with the dollar falling by 2 to 3.5 percentage points within 2 or 3 hours, except against the JPY, where the reaction was muted and delayed. The very low levels of Japanese bond yields shown in Figure 1 probably help explain the very modest Japanese bond futures and foreign exchange reactions in Figure 2 . The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that the U.S. equity futures market-the S&P 500-rose immediately after it opened at 9:30 AM.
On December 1, 2008, Chairman Bernanke gave a speech that suggested that the Federal Reserve could buy Treasuries if the situation warranted. Figure 3 illustrates that this idea elicited a strong and more immediate bond market response than the November 25 release: U.S. and foreign bond futures prices climbed immediately. Foreign exchange markets did not react strongly or consistently to the speech, however.
The December 16 FOMC release that mentioned possible purchases of Treasuries also produced sizeable increases in U.S., British, German, and Canadian bond futures prices, as well as a 1 to 3 percent depreciation of the dollar, which Figure 4 displays. Equity markets also appeared to react positive to the press release, which also reduced the federal funds target from 1 percent to a range of 0 to 25 basis points.
In its January 28 th statement the FOMC failed to announce purchases that were probably partially priced-in, which produced modest bond futures price declines (i.e., higher bond yields) and a 0 to 2 percent appreciation of the dollar at the time of the FOMC statement's release at 2:15 PM (see Figure 5 ). The combination of bond price declines and dollar appreciation is consistent with reduced expectations of bond purchases.
Finally, Figure 6 shows that the March 28 announcement of additional large MBS, agency debt, and new Treasury purchases raised bond futures prices by 1 to 3.5 percent and reduced the value of the dollar by 2 to 3 percent. Prices appear to move faster on March 28 than after previous announcements, suggesting that views were becoming less heterogeneous.
In summary, almost all of the substantial foreign bond market and exchange rate reactions were at or very soon after the estimated times of the announcements, confirming that the LSAP announcements produced substantial price changes in U.S. and foreign assets. The markets often took hours to fully price the announcements, however. The reaction pattern was fairly consistent: Announcements that raised (reduced) U.S. bond futures prices tended to raise (reduce) foreign bond futures prices and reduce (raise) the value of the USD.
Discussion
Section 2 made three testable predictions from the portfolio balance model and UIP-PPP parity conditions about asset prices during LSAP windows: 1) U.S. long-bond expected real returns-or their equivalent in real yields-fall 29 to 150 basis points; 2) the USD jump depreciates according to equation (9); 3) the foreign long-bond nominal yields fall in line with the predictions of the portfolio choice model for real returns in U.S. goods and equation (11).
This section evaluates the extent to which the data bears these predictions out. The troubled state of global credit markets in the autumn of 2008 meant that long-term high-quality asset prices were already very high, by historical standards, when the LSAP was announced. This makes the size of the falls in real U.S. Treasury yields even more surprising. It is very possible that the LSAP buy announcements were interpreted as "bad news" about the global economy and thus provoked a flight to safe U.S. assets. Such a flight would reduce required real returns to U.S. assets, both domestically and in foreign currencies.
Portfolio balance effects and expected real U.S. bond returns
Relative yield changes and exchange rate overshooting
Were the observed USD declines roughly consistent with Section 2's UIP-PPP model predictions, given the changes in relative yields around the LSAP buy events? Equation (9) expressed the exchange rate jump size in terms of changes in relative nominal bond yields and relative expected price levels. Table 4 shows that the implied GBP/USD and EUR/USD jumps are negative on all the buy days, except for January 28, and typically over twice as large as the actual USD jump in the 2-day windows. Some of the discrepancy in actual and predicted jump values can be attributed to December 1, 2008, which was a day of much-better-than-predicted USD performance as bad news provoked a flight-to-safety that will be discussed in section 6.4.
Despite the discrepancy in the magnitude of event sum changes, the predictions and the observed changes in the exchange rate correspond in telling ways: The largest predicted USD -March 18, 2009 , November 25, 2008 , and December 16, 2008 the dates of the three largest depreciations of the dollar against the euro and pound, respectively.
depreciations
And the largest predicted appreciation of the USD against the euro, January 28, 2009, was also the date of the largest actual appreciation against the euro.
Portfolio balance effects and expected foreign bond returns
The ) are well inside the 90 percent confidence intervals for the foreign returns (∆ , , ). The observed changes in foreign long yields are consistent with the portfolio balance model.
Another explanation: Markets interpreted the LSAP as signaling weak growth
The portfolio balance model implies that the LSAP purchases affected yields directly through the term premium by reducing the supply of duration risk and convexity in private
portfolios. An alternative explanation for the LSAP effects is that markets interpreted the announcements as signals that the global economic outlook was much worse than anticipated.
This story would interpret the declines in bond yields as reflecting expectations of much weaker growth over a period of many years.
Do the data support this "forecast of weak growth" hypothesis? Table 6 shows equity percentage returns in the 5 buy announcement windows for 6 major international equity indices: prices was associated with the opening return, with some further fall at the close.
There were a number of negative news reports on December 1 that might explain this bearish action. First, the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer promised to back retail deposits at London Scottish Bank, which market analysts interpreted as effectively backing all retail bank deposits in the U.K. This weakened the GBP and might have created further doubts about global financial stability. Second, U.S. construction spending and the ISM index both came in weaker than expected at 10 AM Eastern Time. Third, at 10:36 AM the NBER dating committee declared that the U.S. was officially in a recession. 21 All of these events could have contributed to the morning equity declines. In addition, the latter two could have weakened the dollar.
The Chairman's speech at 1:40 PM on December 1 produced significant rises in bond futures prices but essentially no movement in foreign exchange or equity markets. That is, the data are not consistent with the idea that the December 1 bond market reaction to the Chairman's speech was purely or mostly due to lower expectations of real activity. Indeed Figures 2 through 6 confirm that the LSAP buy announcements were usually associated with either significant gains in equity prices or with very little reaction at all. The lack of consistent, large drops in equity prices during the LSAP buy windows is not consistent with the hypothesis that bond markets simply interpreted the LSAP announcements as a signal of very weak future growth.
Did the LSAP effects last?
Shortly after the final buy announcement on March 18, 2009, long-term Treasury yields rose fairly steadily, gaining almost 150 basis points by mid-June. Long-term sovereign debt yields from Canada, Germany, and the U.K. similarly rose during the March-to-June period (Figure 1) . These changes led many observers to conclude that the LSAP failed because long yields did not remain low. Why did U.S. and foreign yields increase and does this imply that the LSAP effects did not last? Meyer and Bomfim (2009) argue that higher expected growth, new Treasury issuance, and the return of investors' risk appetite drove the increase in Treasury yields from late March through mid-June 2009. To the extent that the LSAP increased confidence and risk appetites, it sowed the seeds of its own partial reversal; but higher confidence signals success rather than failure. A parallel rise in equity prices over the same March-to-June period tends to corroborate the explanation that higher expected growth and a rise in risk appetites raised long rates.
Does the increase imply that the LSAP's effects on yields were ephemeral? Given that uncertainty about asset prices usually rises with the forecast horizon, no one can know the LSAP's long-term effects; but the market's best guess must have been that the LSAP effects would persist because expectations of a temporary impact would have created a risk-arbitrage opportunity for investors willing to bet on the reversal of the LSAP effects. The efficient markets hypothesis implies that the immediate reaction-a significant fall in real yields-is the market's best guess of the appropriate pricing of the LSAP's effects.
Conclusion
This paper has illustrated that LSAP buy announcements reduced long-term U.S. bond real yields, long-term foreign bond yields, and the spot value of the dollar. The asset price changes associated with the LSAP buy announcements were much too large to have been generated by chance and these price changes closely followed LSAP announcements.
In contrast to the strong effects associated with the creation or expansion of these asset purchase programs, the announcements of minor delays in LSAP purchases or marginal reductions in purchases had small effects. Neither did the LSAP programs influence international short-term interest rates. Likewise, FOMC announcements that were not associated with LSAP news produced relatively small and inconsistent effects on asset prices. The January 28, 2009, FOMC statement produced unusual effects. Although it mentioned the possibility of additional asset purchases, it increased U.S. and foreign bond yields and appreciated the dollar, probably because markets had priced-in a probability of expanded LSAP purchases and the lack of such news reduced purchase expectations.
U.S. real 10-year Treasury yields fell by a total of 187 basis points during the 5 LSAP buy windows. This decline is somewhat larger than those predicted by a simple portfolio choice model that was estimated using monthly data from 1985 to 2010, even accounting for sampling variability associated with the model's estimated parameters. The USD exchange rate jumps during the LSAP announcements windows are smaller than, but consistent in direction with those implied by a UIP-PPP model. In contrast, the declines in real (in U.S. goods) foreign bond yields are consistent with the changes in real returns implied by the portfolio choice model.
One plausible explanation for both the unusually large fall in real U.S. bond yields and the relatively small decline in the dollar during LSAP buy windows is that markets interpreted the LSAP buy announcements as bad news for the world economy, provoking flights to safety that further depressed U.S. yields compared with international substitutes and reduced the required return to dollar assets, which reduced the required jump depreciations at LSAP buy announcement times. In summary, the evidence suggests that the LSAP buy announcements had strong portfolio balance effects on bond yields, but also might have increased the demand for safe assets, which magnified the LSAP effect on U.S. bond yields but mitigated the predicted exchange rate effects. Notes: The table describes the 8 events associated with LSAP announcements. The columns denote the date of the announcement, the venue, the time of the event in U.S. Eastern time, the time of the first Bloomberg story on the event, a brief description of the event and a brief description of other possibly significant news events in a 3-day event window from t-1 through t+1. ). Rows 4-5 show the changes in the implied 10-year rate of USD appreciation from BIS zero-coupon bonds and the change in 10-year US inflation expectations during the LSAP buy windows. Rows 6-8 show statistics on the distribution of implied changes in expected foreign bond returns constructed from the right-hand side of equation (11) Notes: The table shows the % change in equity indices in 2-day windows around 5 buy announcements in the LSAP program for 6 major international equity indices: S&P 500, the Australian All-Ordinaries index, the Canadian S&P/TSX composite index, the German Xetra Dax index, the Financial Times All Share index, and the Nikkei 225. The "p-values" in parentheses below the yield changes show the proportions of 2-day changes from January 2005 through June 2010 that were larger in absolute value than the actual change in the 2-day period around the event.
